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ON THE GENERIC IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRUTHFUL BEHAVIOR: 
A SIMPLE APPROACH 
Carmen Beviá and Luis C. Corchón 
ABSTRACT 
We provide an elementary proof showing how in economies with an arbitrary 
number of agents an arbitrary number of public goods and quasi-linear utility 
functions, any efficient and individuaHy rational mechanism is not 
strategy-proof for any economy satisfying a mild regularity requirement. 
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1.- INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognized that most political and economic institutions are 
vulnerable to their participants' strategic manipulation. In voting theory, 
Gibbard [1] and Satterthwaite [6] independently prove that any non-manipulable 
(Le. strategy-proofl mechanism is dictatorial. In economic environments, many 
authors have established various results of the same nature. Hurwicz [2] shows 
that in two-goods, two-person, pure exchange economies, any efficient and 
individually rational allocation mechanism is manipulable (Le. truth is not a 
dominant strategy for sorne agent) in sorne economy in the domain, provided that 
each agent has a positive initial endowment of at least one of the goods, and 
that a sufficiently wide class of convex preferences is covered (see Ledyard 
and Roberts [4] for the public good case). However, these results leave 
unanswered two questions: First, whether similar results are true under 
different assumptions and in cases where there are more than two agents and/or 
more than two goods and second, how large is the set of economies for which 
truth is not a dominant strategy for sorne agent. 
The . work of Saijo [5] and Zhou [7] addressed the first question. Saijo 
[5] studies the problem of the existence of strategy-proof and individually 
rational mechanisms when the Pareto efficient condition is obviated, and he 
proves that there is a non-constant mechanism that satisfies the aboye two 
requirements in economies with or without public goods. In the same paper 
Saijo proves that if the individually rational condition is strengthened, a 
new impossibility result appears. More precisely, in public good economies, no 
strategy-proof mechanism yielding participative allocations exists. An 
allocation is participative if every participant's bundle is no worse than the 
best bundle that can be achieved solely by the participant's endowment and 
technology, without using that of other participants. On the other hand, new 
proof techniques based on the identification of the geometric properties of 
the Pareto efficient set, enable Zhou [7] to prove fresh results. He shows 
that in the domain of pure exchange economies with two agents and arbitrarily 
many goods in which both agents' utility functions are continuous, strictly 
concave and increasing, any efficient and non-inversely-dictatorial allocation 
mechanism is manipulable for sorne economy in the domain. 
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Hurwicz and Walker [3] provide an answer to the second question. Using 
advanced techniques, they proved that, in economies with quasi-linear utility 
functions any strategy-proof mechanism defined on a convex and semi -open set 
of strictIy concave and continuous valuations of the public goods, will not 
yield Pareto efficient allocations on any open and dense set of preference 
profiles, except by producing allocations that lie on the relative boundary of 
the feasible seto (Notice that a mechanism that gives the total endowment to 
participant one regardless of the preference announcements of other 
participants is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient). This result shows that, 
with the exception of constant mechanisms, under sorne restrictions on the set 
of admissible preferences, Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness are two 
generally incompatible requirements. 
In this paper we prove a result which is on the line of Hurwicz and 
Walker [3], namely that in economies with an arbitrary number of agents, an 
arbitrary number of public goods and quasi-linear utility functions, any 
efficient and individually rational mechanism is not strategy-proof for any 
regular economy i. e., an economy where the valuations of the public goods are 
strictIy concave, eZ and their Gaussian curvature are non-vanishing (see 
Theorem 1 below). This result is stronger and it implies that of Hurwicz and 
Walker [3] (see Theorem 2 below), but it differs from theirs in the 
assumptions -we require individual rationality, but we do not as sume 
continuity of the mechanism- and that we use only elementary techniques. 
Furthermore, our Theorem 1 identifies those economies (the regular ones) for 
which to announce the truth is not a dominant strategy for sorne agent. Hurwicz 
and Walker did not, since they only obtain a generic resulto Moreover, our 
approach allows for a graphical representation when there are two agents and 
one public good. It goes without saying that it is very easy to adapt our 
argument and to show that in exchange economies with an arbitrary number of 
agents, an arbitrary number of private goods and quasi-linear utility 
functions, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is not 
strategy-proof for any regular economy (appropiately defined). 
The rest of this note goes as follows. The next Section explains the 
model and the main definitions and Section 3 gathers our main results. 
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2.- THE MODEL AND DEFINITIONS 
There are n agents in the society. There is one private good (it is 
sometimes helpful to think of this good as "money"), and there are m public 
goods. Public goods are produced from the private good by means of a constant 
returns to scale technology represented by a linear cost funetion eL). A 
consumption for agent i is a pair (xl'y) e 1R~+m where XI e IR + is the private 
good he consumes on his own, and y e IRm is the vector of public goods. Let 
+ 
(w,O) e 1R1+m be agent i's initial endowment (Le., we as sume that there are 
1 + 
initially no publie goods ). Let 
n 
x = { (x, y) e IRn+m 
+ 
I L (w
l 
- xI) = c(y) } 
1 =1 
be the set of feasible allocations. Eaeh agent i has a preferenee relation 
defined over 1R1+m represented by a quasi-linear (on money) utility function 
+ 
u: 1R1+m ~ IR. Let U be the (exogenously given) set of admissible preferences 
1 + 1 
for agent L U denotes the product space U = U x ... x U . A generic point u = 
1 n 
(u , .. ,U ) in U is called a preference profile. Sometimes we will refer to u e 
1 n 
U as an economy, and this will be written as (u,u), where 
1 -1 
u = (u , .. ,U ,u , .. ,u). 
-1 1 1-1 1+1 n 
An economy u e U is said to be regular if for all i = 1, ... ,n, vIL) is 
e2 d t· tI ·th . h· G· t (1) an s rlC y concave Wl non-vams mg aUSSlan curva ure . 
R L Let us denote by U the space of all regular economies. Let U be the 
space of all linear eeonomies. 
Given an economy u e U, a feasible allocation (x,y) is Pareto efficient 
for u if no other feasible allocation (X' ,y') exists such that 
u
I 
(x;,y') ~ ul(xl'y) for all i with striet inequality for at least one agent. 
(1) Our 
v(.) ls 
results remalns true If we 
2 
concave and e for aH 
curvature for at least two agents. 
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redefine a regular economy as one such that 
agents and lt has a non-vanlshlng Gausslan 
Given an economy u e U, a feasible aHocation (x,y) is individually 
rational for u if u (x ,y) ~ u (w ,O) for all i. 
1 1 1 1 
An allocation (xL,l) is a Lindahl allocation for ueU, if it is feasible 
and there is a price vector p e IRID one for each i such that, 
I + 
L L (1) X + p y ;S W i = 1, .. ,n I I I 
(2) u (x ,y) > u (xL,l) implies XI + PlY > W., = 1, .. ,n I I I I 
(3) m p l- c(l) ~ m p y - c(y) 
LI=l 1 Ll=l I 
An allocation (XM,yM) is called a monopoly point for u e U when agent i 
behaves as a monopolist if it is feasible and there is a price vector p e IRID j + 
one for each j such that 
M M (1 ') X + P y ;S W ,f or all j j j j 
(2') u(x,y) > u (xM,yM) implies X + py > W for aH j '* jj jj j j j 
(3') [;=lPl M- c(yM) ~ [;=lPl- c(y) 
(4') u (xM,yM) ~ u (x ,y) for all (x,y) e X satisfying (1'), (2') and (3'). 
I I I I 
Since the cost function is convex, condition (3) and (3') can be replaced 
m ac(y) 
by LI=llk = ay 
k 
k = l, ... ,m. 
It is clear that for any regular economy, both the Lindahl allocation and 
the monopoly point existo 
A (direct) mechanism is a function f: U ~ X, which maps each 
preference profile into the set of feasible allocations. Let fl(u) = (xI'y) be 
the consumption obtained by i if the profile u is announced. 
A mechanism f is efficient if for any u e U, f(u) is a Pareto efficient 
allocation for u. 
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A mechanism f is individually rational if for any u E U, f(u) is an 
individually rational allocation for u. 
A mechanism f is strategy-proof if for any agent i, any u E U and any 
U' E U , u (f (U ,U » ~ U (f (U' ,U ». 
1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
Given an economy U E U, a mechanism f is strategy-proof for u if for any 
agent i, and any U' E U , U (f (U ,U » ~ U (f (U' ,U » 
1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 -1 
Notice that the latter of these two definitions is weaker than the former 
and is the one which will be used in Theorem 1 below. Thus, our results are 
stronger, for example, than the one obtained by Ledyard and Roberts [4], 
because they use the former definition. 
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3. THE MAIN RESULTS 
We start this section proving that given a regular economy, the agent who 
behaves as a monopolist is strictly better off in the monopoly allocation than 
in the Lindahl allocation (see Lemma 1 below). This Lernma will be used to 
prove our main result (Theorem O. Later on Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 will prove 
an analogous result to that of Hurwicz-Walker [31. 
M M L Lemma 1: Giyen a regular economy u e U, if (x
1
,y ) » O and y ~ O then 
L L M M (2) 
U (x ,y ) < u (x ,y ) . 
1 1 i 1 
Proof. Since (xL,i) is the Lindahl allocation for u, i satisfies: 
n 
1=1 
ay (y) 
1 ----~ 
ac(y) 
ay 
J 
j = l, .. ,m [11 
if (xM,yM) is the allocation obtained if agent i behayes as a monopolist, yM 
satisfies: 
Since 
n 
1=1 
ay (y) 
1 
ay j 
ac(y) 
ay j 
ro 
l:;t:l k=1 
a
2y (y) 
1 
-----yk j = l, .. ,m [2J 
ay ay 
k j 
L L (x ,y ) L L M M • satisfies (1'),(2'),(3'), u(x,y) ~ u(x,y), then ti 
1 1 1 1 
is 
L L M M L L that u (x ,y) ~ u (x ,y). Suppose that u (x ,y) = 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
enough to proye 
must satisfy [2J. Since i satisfies [1], this implies that M M L u (x ,y). Then y 
1 1 
ro 
~~ j = l, .. ,m [3J 
1~1 k=1 
Let v(y) = y (y) + .. + Y + Y + ..• + Y (y). Since y is strictly concaye 
1 1-1 1+1 n 1 
for all i, y is strictly concaye. Then we can write [3J as Hy(yL)i ?; O, where 
(2) Vector lnequalities, », >. ?; 
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Hv(.) is the Hessian matrix of the function v. Then (yLlHv(yL)yL ~ O, but 
this is a contradiction since i ~ O and (yLlHv(yL)yL < O because v is 
strictly concave with a non-vanishing Gaussian curvature .• 
Now we are prepared to prove our main result 
Theorem 1. Let f: U --7 X with f(u) » O lr:Ju e U be an efficient and 
individuaHy rational mechanism with UL ~ U. Then, f is not strategy-proof for 
any regular economy in U such that (x~,yM) » O and yL ~ O. 
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Proof. We first consider the case of n = 2, m = 1, in order to offer a 
graphical insight on how the proof works. A formal proof is then offered. 
Given a regular economy u e U (see Figure 1) let B-B' be the set of all 
efficient and individuaHy rational allocations for u. Since mechanism f is 
efficient and individually rational, f(u) must be at some point between B and 
B'. Suppose that it is between B and L (L is the Lindahl allocation for u). 
Then agent 1 can misrepresent his utility function by sending a constant 
marginal rate of substitution equal to his monopoly prices (the dotted line in 
Figure 1). He obtains an allocation in the new efficient and individually 
rational set M-F (M is his monopoly point). For any point therein, agent 1 is 
better off than before. Jf f(u) is at some point between L and B', agent 2 
would manipulate accordingly. 
We now provide a formal proof of the Theorem. Let u e U be a regular 
economy such that (xL,i)>> O, and let (x,y) = f(u,u ). Since (xL,yL) and 
i -i 
(x,y) are Pareto efficient, there exists i such that 
x + v (y) ~ xL + V (yL). 
1 1 1 1 
where x + v (y) i = 1, ... , n are the true utility functions relative to the 
i 1 
economy u. Suppose that agent i sends a utility function 
m 
U'(X ,y) == r pM y + X 
1 1 L lk k 1 
k=l 
where pM are the monopoly prices of the economy u with i as a monopolist. Let 
ki M M (x',y') = f(u',u ), and let (x ,y ) be the consumption of agent i in the 
1 -1 1 
economy u when he is a monopolist. We claim that 
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M M X' + V (y'). X + V (y ) ~ 
1 1 1 1 
Suppose that 
M M X' + V (y'). X + V (y ) > 
1 i i i 
Since (XM,yM) and (x',y') are Pareto efficient allocations for the economy 
M M (u',u ), our assumptions imply that y = y', so X > X'. At the monopoly 
1 -1 1 i 
point the budget constraint for i is satisfied, so w = 
1 
[ P:l y~ + X;, which is a contradiction because the mechanism is individually 
k=l 
rationaL This proves the claim. Therefore, and by the previous lemma 
X + V (y) ~ xL + V (l) < x M + V (yM) ~ X' + V. (y' ) 
11 i i i i 1 
which shows that mechanism f is not strategy-proof for u .• 
"\ \ ~:~: 
\\\\\." / 7 " " " ! ...... i~ , 
, 
\ i 
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, (w, ,w
2
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2 
Figure 1 
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In Theorem 1 we have just proved the impossibility of truthful behavior 
on the set of regular economies when efficiency and individual rationality are 
imposed on the mechanism. Now we address the question of how big is the set of 
regular "economies. We prove that the set of strictiy concave functions is 
dense, with the Punctual Topology, in the set of concave functions. Thus, the 
set of regular economies is dense in the set of admissible preferences. 
Lemma 2. The set of regular economies is dense in the set of all economies 
with concave utility functions. 
Proof. We will show that the set of strictly concave functions with a 
non-vanishing Gaussian curvature is dense in the set of concave functions. 
Let 'ff- = (f: IRm ~/ f is concave). 
e 
Let 'ff- = (f: IRm ~/ f is strictly concave). 
se 
Claim 1. A sequence (f : n e IN) !;; 'ff- exists such that (f : n e IN) converges, 
n se n 
with the punctual convergency, to the zero function. 
For each n e IN, let f (x) = ~ rm x2. Clearly, f is strictly concave, with 
n n Ll =1 1 n 
a non-vanishing Gaussian curvature and (f (x): n e IN) converges to zero for 
n 
each x e IRm • 
Claim 2. F or each f e 'ff- , a sequence (g : n e IN) !;; 'ff- exists such that (g : 
e n se n 
n e IN) converges, with the punctual convergency, to f. 
For each n e IN, let g (x) = f(x) + f (x), with f (x) being as we described in 
n n n 
Claim 1. Since for each n e IN, f rs strictly concave and f is concave, g is 
n n 
strictly concave. Thus, g e 'ff- for each n e IN. By Claim 1 (f: n e IN) 
n se n 
converges to the zero functíon, then (g : n e IN) converges to f .• 
n 
An examination of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that whenever a regular 
economy is considered, an agent has incentives to deviate announcing an 
appropriate linear utility function. By Lemma 2, it is possible to carry out 
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the proof by taking only strictly concave (with non-vanishing Gaussian 
curvature) valuations of the public goods, Le. Theorem 1 remains true if the 
set of admissible preferences is restricted to be the set of regular 
economies. 
R Theorem 2. Let f: U ~ X with f(u) » O 'Vu e U be an efficient and 
individuaLLy rational mechanism. Then, f is not strategy-proof for any regular 
M M L 
economy in U such that (x ,y ) » O and y * O. 
1 
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